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INTRODUCTION
The majority of international analyses examining the lessons
of the crisis since the summer of 2007 emphasise that the
institutions responsible for systemic risks all around the
world did not intervene in due course, i.e. when risks started
to build up. Studying the background of the causes, the
question of what hindered the authorities in taking the
necessary steps arises. Were they not aware of the magnitude
of the risks? Did they lack the proper tools? Or did they fear
that potentially unilateral supervisory tightening measures –
concerning only the given country – would entail
unreasonably large growth sacrifices?
Oversight of the smooth operation of the financial system is
basically the responsibility of the central banks. This is
because major difficulties in the financial system, i.e. in the
financial markets, the financial infrastructure or at the
financial institutions, may – in addition to weakening the
efficiency of monetary transmission – be accompanied by
material losses of the real economy. Therefore, in order to
avoid this, central banks monitor the operation of the entire
financial system continuously, and – relying on the standard
instruments of central banks – ensure its continuous liquidity,
while also playing a significant role in the operation of the
infrastructure. Their ‘lender of last resort’ function also
serves the purpose of avoiding a confidence crisis spreading
across the entire intermediary system, by providing a ‘quick
fix’ for temporary liquidity problems.
The risks leading to the outbreak of the present crisis were
mostly known individually, since each had been identified
years before in international central bank and other analyses.
The impact analysis of the interaction between the various
risk types or that of their simultaneous emergence, i.e. an
examination of the system as a whole (macro-prudential
analysis), however, did not take place or was inadequate.
Unaware of the actual magnitude of the threat, public policy
decision-makers felt no urgent need to take risk-mitigating
measures. Naturally, there were also very strong counter-
arguments proposed by the financial institutions against any
active intervention. The “approved” instrument of
preventing the build-up of risks was reliance on the advanced
risk measurement of market participants and increasingly
sophisticated risk management techniques, such as – for
example – spreading risks through securitisation. In addition,
the authorities responsible for regulation were too concerned
about economic growth to seriously contemplate curbing
risks and the accompanying restrictions.
However, the events following the summer of 2007 proved
that – even if players appeared to be sound individually –
risks might emerge at the level of the financial system, which
may jeopardise the stability of the entire system. The most
obvious example of this in Hungary is retail foreign currency
lending.
Although it will take a long time to recover fully from the
current crisis, the foundations for an institutional system
capable of preventing the next, equally devastating crisis
should be established now, during the period of critical
atmosphere. The common conclusion of crisis analyses is that
one of the most imperative steps is to strengthen the
framework for macro-prudential analyses and interventions.
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Stronger, more efficient control of the financial system can primarily be ensured by strengthening macro-prudential
supervisory activities focusing on the risks of the financial system as a whole. This may be facilitated, first of all, by closer
cooperation between central banks and supervisory authorities, as well as by broadening the powers and intervention
opportunities of these authorities. The European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) and the European System of Financial
Supervisors (ESFS) are being established in the European Union in order to apply these principles in practice. Similarly to
several other countries, Hungary is also planning to reform its supervisory system: according to the plans, both the central
bank and the supervisory authority will have more powerful tools at their disposal, and a Financial Stability Council will
be established to harmonise the activities of the national authorities more closely.
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and managing the individual, institution-level risks (micro-
prudential analysis) lies with the financial supervision,
systemic risk-level analyses and evaluations covering the
entire system belong rather to the scope of the central banks’
responsibility  (macro-prudential analysis). Table 1 below
illustrates the differences between the two approaches.
MONITORING SYSTEMIC RISKS
Macro-prudential analyses should essentially address two
dimensions of systemic risks (EFC Working Group, 2009).
First of all, they should examine the distribution of risks
among sectors, i.e. the type and magnitude of risks affecting
the main sub-units of the intermediary system at that point of
time. In this regard, common or correlated exposures
amplifying each other should be identified, and when they
reach a critical level, markets and regulators should both be
alerted.
There is, however, also another dimension of systemic risks
which so far has received less attention, i.e. the so-called time
dimension. Analyses of this nature inspect the evolution of
systemic risks over time and the way the behaviour of the
system’s participants amplifies these risks. Namely,
procyclical behaviour by the system’s institutions may
considerably amplify the impact of real economic cycles,
thereby generating severe real economic damages both in
periods of recovery and recession. Analysis of the cyclical
character of financial intermediation and publication of the
result should essentially serve three main objectives:
–  Assistance should be provided to markets in properly
assessing the dynamics of the evolution of systemic risks
and the stage of such evolution at a certain point of time.
– Mechanisms that drive individual players to the optimal
solutions at systemic level, i.e. to the dampening of cyclical
fluctuations, must be found.
– It must be achieved that systemic risk considerations are




But how can a central bank make a stand for its position and
what kind of mechanisms can serve to mitigate systemic risks?
One of the main lessons of the crisis is that no proper
intervention instrument was available for the financial
stability tasks of those central banks that do not supervise
individual institutions. Thus, the question arises whether the
other existing central bank instruments – such as interest rate
policy as a monetary policy instrument – should be used for
financial stability objectives, or whether these central banks
should be equipped with new instruments.
According to a recently published IMF analysis, monetary
policy must indeed internalise financial stability
considerations, which essentially can be done in three ways.
Financial stability as a goal complementing the objective of
price stability could be included in the ultimate goals of
monetary policy. Another solution is that the range of indices
– considered for the achievement of interim goals – be
expanded to include variables such trends in asset prices or
credit market developments. A third option is that the time
horizon of realising interim goals be extended. The latter
would encourage decision-makers to also take account of the
longer processes influencing the operation of the financial
system (Nier, E. W, 2009). Herein the author – while
analysing the lessons of the crisis – comes to the conclusion
that both the efficiency of monetary policy and the quality of
supervision can be improved, if the supervisory function is
exercised by the central bank. According to the arguments for
this solution, monetary policy may be facilitated by the more
detailed information available about all sub-units of the
financial system, while the quality of supervision may be
positively influenced by the experience obtained by the
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Source: Borio, C. (2006).
Macro-prudential Micro-prudential
Proximate objective Limit financial system-wide distress Limit distress of individual institutions
Ultimate objective Avoidance of output (GDP) costs Consumer (investor/depositor) protection
Characterisation of risk (Partially) endogenous Exogenous
Correlation and common exposures across 
Important Irrelevant
institutions
Calibration of prudential controls In terms of system-wide risks: “top-down”
In terms of risks of individual institutions:
“bottom-up”
Table 1
Comparison of the macro- and micro-prudential perspectivescentral bank about the markets and the operation of the
infrastructure, and the undoubted interest in the
minimisation of resorting to the final lender.
In another group of analyses, the new challenge and task for
the central banks is primarily seen in dampening the cyclical
impacts. The proposed new instruments are also connected
to this range of issues. Modification of the loan-to-value ratio
in parallel with movements in the economic cycle could be a
relatively simple instrument (Brunnermeier et al., 2009),
where tightening may compensate for overvalued collaterals
and the easing of lending conditions. On the other hand, in a
recessionary environment relaxation of this ratio may boost a
recovery.
According to further proposals which are still being
formulated (Tucker, 2009), in order to curb procyclical
behaviour, central banks should stipulate higher risk weights
than those set out in the capital regulation for the asset
groups deemed risky. In an opposite case, in the descending
phase of the cycle, along the same lines of logic, relief
measures could also be implemented. Thus the central banks,
similarly to the supervision’s discretionary power referred to
as Pillar 2 in the Basel capital accord, would have the
opportunity to override – at a banking system level, and
based on the condition of the whole financial system – the
capital requirements of certain exposure types in order to
reduce cyclical impacts.
The idea has also arisen that the central bank’s existing,
liquidity crisis management powers should be enlarged with
more general crisis management tools. In order to retain
confidence in the integrity of the system, it may be necessary
to take over control of certain banks – the ones with
considerable amounts of deposits or which are important due
to their active market relations – if the operability of the bank
in question is jeopardised. This so-called early intervention
tool may, in theory, fall under the competence of several
authorities, but due to the potential role of the supervisory
authority in the development of the situation, the
empowering of an independent player, i.e. the central bank,
with these crisis management authorities may be a logical
step. In this case, the central bank would be authorised to
intervene to find new owners for the still viable parts of the
bank in order to prevent the potential damage arising from
the possible protracted impairment of the credit institution
concerned. With this, the central bank could ensure that
services are maintained with the least possible uncertainties
to the most possible – essentially insured – depositors, in
addition to minimising the costs of a potential bank bailout
burden for the taxpayers.
Opponents of the previous innovative proposals share the
view that central banks should stick to sending strong signals.
Risk-mitigating intervention is the task of the regulatory and
supervisory institutions. At the same time, this approach also
provides a new instrument for strengthening the voice of the
central bank: application of the “act or explain” mechanism
in the central bank’s communication, previously only familiar
as a micro-prudential supervisory instrument. In addition to
publishing the results of their risk assessment, central banks
would supplement them with action proposals addressed to
the regulatory and supervisory authorities, which should
either follow those or provide a reasonable explanation for
rejecting them.
CHANGES AT THE EUROPEAN LEVEL
In its proposals regarding the structural transformation of the
European Union’s financial supervision, the expert group led
by Jacques de Larosière also pointed out that too much
attention was being paid to the examination of individual
institutions in the EU as well (De Larosière et al., 2009). The
horizon must be expanded: more attention should be paid to
the risks outside the banking sector and those arising from
the interaction between certain sectors, and to the
macroeconomic contexts, the procyclical impacts and the
sources of threats from outside Europe. However, not only
the approaches need to be changed, as structural and
organisational modifications also need to be made at both
European and member state levels.
Although the proposal to transfer the supervision of
international financial groups to Community level was raised
again as a reform option and received support from Hungary
as well, due to the fiscal dimension of supervision and crisis
management, no transformation of this magnitude will take
place, for lack of Community resources available for this
purpose. Nevertheless, the financial supervision is still
becoming “more international”. Pursuant to the conclusions
of the European Council, the new two-level (macro- and
micro-prudential) European supervision system (Chart 1)
proposed by the de Larosière report will be set up in 2010.
This entails the establishment of the European Systemic Risk
Board (ESRB), the main role of which will be to reveal the
systemic risks jeopardising the financial stability of the EU.
Central banks will play a dominant role on the board, but the
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represented, without voting rights.
1 The ESRB will not have
its own, direct intervention instruments to forestall identified
macro-prudential risks. Instead, it will draw attention to
sources of threats and, when appropriate, it will put forward
specific proposals, as required, to ECOFIN, the member
states or supervisory authorities for the mitigation of risks.
While these proposals will not be legally binding, the
“addressees” will be expected to provide an explanation if
they fail to implement the proposed actions (the so-called
“act or explain” mechanism).
In addition to this, there will be changes in the field of
micro-prudential supervision as well: the European System
of Financial Supervisors (ESFS) will be established with a
mandate to provide a framework for closer cooperation
among national supervisions. The existing European
supervisory committees – whose role is currently limited to
consultation and coordination – will become authorities
(European Supervisory Authorities, ESA), and will be
primarily responsible for the standardisation of member
states’ regulations and supervisory practices, as well as for
facilitating cooperation among the national supervisions.
Supervision of financial markets and individual institutions,
however, will fundamentally remain a national
responsibility.
CHANGES AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL
In parallel with the Community-level changes, structural
changes all around the world, and thus also in the member
states of the European Union, have occurred and more are
expected to take place in the near future. Although the
reasons underlying the specific supervisory changes vary
(national experiences of the present crisis, legal specifics,
conflicting professional and political considerations, etc.), the
strengthening of the macro-prudential orientation appears to
be a clear trend. Several of the aforementioned possible,
systemic-risk mitigating changes appear in the existing
national plans. The reform trends known so far can be
divided up into at least three directions.
Several nations are strengthening and institutionalising
coordination among the authorities responsible for financial
stability. In the United Kingdom – according to the
government’s plan – a Council for Financial Stability would
be set up with the participation of the HM Treasury, the
Bank of England and the FSA, which would regularly review
systemic risks, consider intervention measures and –
especially upon the occurrence of material risks – would
represent a forum for quick, coordinated authority
intervention. In Belgium, in the transitory period preceding
the integration of the supervision into the central bank, the
establishment of the Systemic Risk Committee is planned
with the representation of the central bank and the
supervisory authority. In the United States, the government’s
proposals include the establishment of the Financial Services
Oversight Council (FSOC). Headed by the Treasury
Department, the task of the body – formed of representatives
of the Federal Reserve (FED) and the various sectors’
supervisory authorities – would be to identify systemic risks,
regulatory shortcomings and institutions of systemic
importance.
Furthermore, several countries are planning to transfer
micro-prudential supervision to the central bank, thereby
practically “circumventing” the problem of coordination
between the micro- and macro-prudential supervision. In
Ireland, micro-prudential supervision, which from 2003 until
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1 Membership of ESRB will be rather large. Apart from the chairman and the deputy chairman, the chairman of the 27 central banks, the chairman of ECB, one member
of the European Commission and the chairmen of three European supervisory authorities will be also members. In addition to this, a supervisory authority
representative from each of the 27 member states, as well as the chairman of EFC will be non-voting members. Accordingly, in order to ensure the smooth operation
of the institution with such an extremly number of members, a select decision preparation board of 9 people, a so-called “Steering committee” is also established, the
members of which will only include the chairman and deputy chairman of ESRB, five central bank chairmen, three European authorities, the chairman of EFC and a
Commission representative. The secretarial functions will be performed by ECB, but a so-called “Advisory Technical Committee” will be also set up, which will
cooperate in specific issues, falling outside the competence of the ECB secretariat.now has been practically a fully autonomous branch within
the central bank, will be integrated in the unit responsible for
system stability. At the time of writing this article, the
governments in Belgium and Germany had already passed
decisions on integration, in the area of supervision of all
financial sectors in the former, and in the area of banking
supervision in the latter.
The third amendment direction taking shape is the
“installation” of such independent, quasi-regulatory
intervention instruments at the central banks that may be
used for achieving macro-prudential goals. According to the
US plans, mentioned above, the FED would be responsible
for the specifically macro-prudential focused supervision of
institutions important in terms of systemic risks, and the
central bank would also stipulate more stringent
requirements (e.g. liquidity, leverage) for these institutions,
and – in crisis situations – it could stabilise the system on its
own by taking over the control of the institution. In the
Czech Republic, the new intervention instrument of the
Czech National Bank (CNB) – also responsible for
supervision – has already been approved. In situations
jeopardising financial stability, the CNB may prohibit or
restrict risky activities for a limited – maximum 180-day –
period, or may grant exemptions from certain legal
requirements.
In the United Kingdom as well, several proposals were made
to provide the central bank – similar to the interest rate in
monetary policy – with a macro-prudential policy instrument
of its own, the main objective of which would be the
mitigation of pro-cyclical impacts. Potential instruments of
this type which have been contemplated so far include
increasing/lowering capital requirements, changing the LTV
ratio and dynamic provisioning. Although the reform plans
of the government published in June do not include this type
of new policy instrument, related analyses are being
conducted in the Bank of England and their proposals will be
submitted for public consultation soon. In addition, based on
a new law adopted in the beginning of 2009 the Bank of
England was provided with new, extremely powerful
instruments for managing potentially severe operational or
solvency problems of banks of systemic importance: thus it
may sell the credit institution concerned even against the will
of the owners, or transfer its assets and liabilities to a publicly
owned “bridge bank”.
HUNGARIAN PLANS
In order to expand the modest range of instruments available
to prevent the build-up of risks, to determine clear
responsibilities necessary for the efficient management of the
potential financial crises, and to accelerate the supervisory
authority’s decision-making mechanism, the Hungarian
government also decided to review the supervisory and
financial stability framework. Having considered a number of
possible alternatives, the government put forward a bill to the
Parliament which is aimed at providing both the Hungarian
Financial Supervisory Authority (HFSA) and the MNB with
more efficient tools, while at the same time strengthening the
coordination between micro- and macro-prudential
supervisions.
2
The bill defines the role of the various authorities – i.e. the
Ministry of Finance (MoF), the HFSA and the MNB – in
financial supervision and regulation, as well as the related
scopes of responsibilities. This partly implies new directions,
and partly intends to clarify existing roles.
The MoF is responsible for regulation of financial markets
and the implementation of the financial policy framework of
the government’s economic strategy. The HFSA will continue
to focus on the stability and prudent operation of individual
institutions, but the exploration and mitigation of activities
and risks jeopardising certain sectors will also receive more
attention. The HFSA will retain its right to take measures
against the individual institutions, and at the very worst,
intervene in their operation. (One must recall that the
shortcomings or potential insolvency of a complex or large
institution may jeopardise the entire financial system.) The
central bank assumes the primary responsibility for detecting
the risks jeopardising the stability of the entire financial
system, which the law also intends to make more explicit.
The three authorities can only take joint responsibility for
safeguarding the stability of the financial system. The most
important forum of cooperation between the supervisory
and regulatory authorities will be a new body, the Financial
Stability Council
3 (FSC), established for the strategic
control of the HFSA, where all three parties will be
represented. The establishment of the FSC means – amongst
other things – that the central bank’s macro-prudential
considerations may be represented in the supervision’s
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2 Prior to completion of this article the Parliament had not yet adopted the law, and thus we only describe the expected planned changes deemed most relevant in
terms of our topics.
3 In fact, the FSC was established as an enhancement of the Financial Stability Committee – operating since 2005 – with the involvement of the MNB, the Ministry of
Finances and the HFSA. The former body was merely a consultative, rather than a decision-making forum, and its activity was based not on a legal act, but only on the
MoU between the three authorities.activity more effectively, thus – for example – in the
determination of the inspection target areas or the content
of HFSA’s recommendations. Since the dividing line
between the individual, sectoral and system level risks is not
always clear, the FSC will also serve the coordination of the
two authorities’ risk analyses.
The bill would also provide MNB itself with new powers to
prevent the rapid build-up of systemic risks which it
identifies. On the one hand, through predefined rules or
procedures, the bill would ensure that the central bank’s
systemic risk warnings are followed by regulatory reaction.
According to the bill, if – in the interest of preserving
financial stability – the MNB proposes codification of laws to
the government or the HFSA, they will have to provide a
detailed explanation in the case of rejection, as is the case
with the recommendations of the European Systemic Risk
Board described above. (The FSC would also be provided
with a similar – i.e. “strengthened” by mandatory
explanation – right of recommendation.)
On the other hand, if risks build up rapidly, the MNB would
have the opportunity to intervene directly as well, and could
restrict, prohibit or make subject to conditions certain
activities or products for a limited time (maximum 120
days).
4 The MNB could act in this manner if a certain activity
or product impacts a large number of institutions, consumers
or investors, and the aggregated risk would jeopardise the
stability of the entire financial system. This, so-called
forward-looking intervention authority would facilitate the
containment of risks already in the phase of their build-up for
fear that certain financial institutions become unable to
operate or larger groups of consumers or investors suffer
severe losses. Naturally, even with the use of such
instruments, only legislation with unlimited time scope could
provide a long-term solution, which could be initiated by the
MNB at the competent authority, i.e. at the Ministry of
Finance or the HFSA.
CONCLUSIONS
The crisis has made it clear at the global level that stronger
attention must be paid to systemic risks as part of financial
supervision. Not only the individual risk types on their own
are relevant, as the interactions and identification of trends
which intensify each other also need to be investigated. In
addition, more attention than previously needs to be paid to
the cyclical movements of risks, so that overheated as well as
severe recessionary situations, which also impact the
performance of the real economy, can be avoided.
Progress should be made not only in the identification of
systemic risks, but the administrative instruments and
procedures – facilitating the prevention of threats – must also
be enhanced and improved. In this latter area, there are a
larger number of unresolved issues.
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Source: MNB.
Note: Planned changes are printed in bold.
Table 2
Planned new supervisory, financial stability structure
Government/MoF HFSA Central bank Financial Stability Council
Ultimate goal maintenance of fi  nancial stability
Institutional 
goal, task
•   ensuring undisturbed 
economic development, 
adherence to the general 
government balance stipulated 
by the Parliament
•   regulation of the money, 
capital and insurance markets
•   ensuring the undisturbed and 
prudent operation of fi  nancial 
organisations and markets
•   consumer protection 
•   ensuring the undisturbed 
development of the economy 
under long-term price stability
•   identifi  cation of systemic risks
•   ensuring the coordination 
among the institutions 
responsible for fi  nancial 
stability
•   development of the fi  nancial 
supervisory strategy
Tools
•   preparation of bills
•   enactment of regulations
•   utilisation of general 
government resources
•   issuance of binding 
regulations (?)
•   temporary measures in the 
case of acute systemic risks (?)
•   supervisory recommendations, 
circulars, ICAAP-SREP dialogue
•   inspection, taking measures, 
imposing penalties
•   proposals for legislation
•   temporary measures in the 
case of acute systemic risks 
(?)
•   lender of last resort
•   proposals for legislation
4 When this article was being written, it had not yet been decided whether this right will be granted to the HFSA or the MNB. Based on a motion for amendment,
submitted to the original bill, the HFSA would be the authority that could restrict or prohibit the activities or products representing systemic risks, subject to informing
the MNB in advance and prior consultation with the FSC. Similarly, when submitting the manuscript, it was still unsure whether or not the HFSA will be vested with
the power to issue binding regulations.First of all, the mechanisms ensuring the provision of proper
responses by the authorities to identified risks must be
created. This, as the case may be, could be supervisory or
regulatory intervention. Since the organisational structure of
central bank, and the regulatory and supervisory functions
varies from country to country, it can be stated generally that
coordination among organisations responsible for systemic
risks must be strengthened.
The situation, when the source of the risk is a clearly
identifiable institution that is important in terms of systemic
risk, requires a special approach. The crisis has also
demonstrated that instruments need to be developed to
ensure that such institutions only rarely, if ever, find
themselves in a liquidation situation, but on the other hand,
owners cannot abuse their special situation and that their
extreme risk taking is not left without consequences. In this
area, the European Commission recently launched a
communication with the aim of developing a common
European framework for the resolution of international
banking groups, however – in addition to the Community
regulation – the strengthening of the instruments would be
necessary at national level as well.
Apart from the operation of the national crisis management
authorities, the success of the newly established two-tier
European supervisory system in the supervision of large
international financial groups’ activity is a key issue. For the
time being, it is not yet clear whether the institutions to be set
up during 2010 will have adequate influence on the activity
of the national regulatory and supervisory authorities, and
whether in the case of problems that may affect several
member states, coordination will be more successful than it
was in 2008 and 2009.
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